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Nevertheless She Persisted:
Comparing Roe v. Wade’s Two Oral Arguments
Catherine Martin Christopher*
There is a longstanding and popular sentiment in the legal profession
that oral arguments do not really matter; rather, everything rides on the
written briefs. This Article takes that old adage head on, and does so through
analysis of one of the most controversial cases ever decided by the United
States Supreme Court: Roe v. Wade. It is a little-known fact that Roe was
argued before the Court not once, but twice, which presents a unique
opportunity to consider the place and power of oral arguments in Supreme
Court jurisprudence.
This Article offers a comprehensive analysis and critique of the two
oral arguments in Roe. The Article first analyzes the oral arguments
pragmatically, undertaking a scholarly investigation of the arguments to
investigate their impact on the majority opinion. Next, the Article proceeds
theoretically, engaging in a feminist legal theory analysis to assess how the
Roe arguments were both a product of their time and shaped feminist legal
theory going forward.
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Be brief, be pointed; let your matter stand
Lucid in order, solid, and at hand;
Spend not your words on trifles, but condense;
Strike with the mass of thought, not drops of sense[.]1
I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom among Supreme Court observers is that oral
arguments do not impact the Justices’ decisions. Besides being illogical—
why would the Court hold oral arguments if they were a waste of time?—
this conventional wisdom is contradicted by the Justices’ own statements and
data-driven research.2
Oral arguments are perhaps the Justices’ most significant avenue of
independent information-gathering.3 Aside from any independent research

1

Joseph Story, Advice to a Young Lawyer, in 4 A LIBRARY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE:
AN ANTHOLOGY IN ELEVEN VOLUMES, LITERATURE OF THE REPUBLIC, PART I.,
CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD, 1788–1820, 5 (E.C. Stedman & E.M. Hutchinson eds., 1891),
www.bartleby.com/400/poem/767.html.
2
TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 2 (2004).
3
Id.
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the Justices and their clerks conduct, too much of which is time-prohibitive,
all information the Justices have is what the advocates and amici put in front
of them.4 Oral arguments also present a key opportunity for the Justices to
signal to each other which way they are leaning and coordinate about final
policy outcomes.5
Naturally, oral arguments are not the sole, or even the most significant,
determiner of case outcomes.6 But Justices have consistently, and
repeatedly, asserted that oral arguments can and do affect their decisions in
cases:
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.: I have had too many occasions
when my judgment of a decision has turned on what happened in
oral argument. . . . Often my idea of how a case shapes up is
changed by oral argument.7
Justice William Rehnquist: I think that in a significant minority of
cases in which I have heard oral argument, I have left the bench
feeling different about the case than I did when I came on the
bench. The change is seldom a full one-hundred-and-eightydegree swing.8
Justice William O. Douglas: The purpose of a hearing is that the
Court may learn what it does not know . . . . It is the education of
the Justices . . . that is the essential function of the appellate
lawyer.9
Roe v. Wade,10 certainly one of the most controversial Supreme Court
cases in history, was argued before the Supreme Court not only once, but
twice. The first argument was held on December 13, 1971, and the second
on October 11, 1972.11 Few cases are argued twice, but interestingly, those
that are turn out to be tremendously significant cases; for example, Roe v.
Wade, Brown v. Board of Education,12 and Baker v. Carr13 were all argued
4

Id. at 143 n.19.
Id. at 61.
6
See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL
CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 7–8 (1992) (debunking the ideas that the
personalities of the Supreme Court Justices, the “climate of the times,” or the types of litigants
who come before the Court determine case outcomes, and concluding instead that “it is the
law and legal arguments as framed by legal actors that most clearly influence the content and
direction of legal change”) (emphasis in original).
7
JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 15.
8
Id. at 15.
9
Id. at 16.
10
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11
Roe v. Wade, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-18 (last visited Nov. 15,
2018).
12
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (argued Dec. 9–11, 1952; reargued Dec. 7–9, 1953).
13
369 U.S. 186 (1962) (argued Apr. 19–20, 1961; reargued Oct. 9, 1961). In an
interview after his retirement, Chief Justice Earl Warren was asked which case that he
5
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twice.
This Article undertakes a deep analysis of both sets of the Roe v. Wade
oral arguments. Part II summarizes, compares, and contrasts both sets of
oral arguments. This Part also critiques the effective and ineffective oral
advocacy and narrative framing techniques used during the oral arguments.
Part III examines the final majority opinion and traces key points from that
opinion back to the briefs and the oral arguments, thus identifying whether
moments at oral argument germinated into significant features of the
opinion. Part IV deconstructs and contextualizes the oral arguments through
various lenses of feminist legal theory, analyzing how the framing of Roe
was both a product of its time and a shaping force in the feminist legal theory
that developed after the decision. Part V concludes by discussing how the
Roe oral arguments and opinion are full of contradictions. During the oral
arguments, the advocates and Justices used gendered language to discuss a
due process analysis, even though due process is not implicated in gender
discrimination issues. The oral arguments and the majority opinion are also
problematic from a feminist legal theory standpoint because they define the
rights of women by articulating the rights of men, and by finding a
constitutionally protected right while denying autonomous decision-making
by the right-holders.
II. SUMMARY OF THE ORAL ARGUMENTS
The statute at issue in Roe v. Wade was a Texas law prohibiting doctors
from performing abortions except to save the life of the pregnant woman:
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or
knowingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug
or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence or means
whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an
abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two
nor more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the
punishment shall be doubled. By “abortion” is meant that the life
of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman’s womb
or that a premature birth thereof be caused.14
Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or
attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of
the mother.15
participated in was the most significant. He replied, not Brown, Miranda, Gideon, Griswold,
or any of the other cases decided between 1953 and 1969—but Baker, which held that
redistricting for state elected officials is not a political question, and can be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. See More Perfect: The Political Thicket, WNYC STUDIOS (June 9, 2016),
https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/the-political-thicket.
14
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1191 (repealed 1973).
15
§ 1196 (repealed 1973). Related statutes, §§ 1192–95, were also challenged.
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A. The Road to the Courtroom
Before arriving at the United States Supreme Court as Roe v. Wade, the
case began as two separate actions in the Northern District of Texas. Jane
Roe, the now-famous plaintiff, filed one suit alleging that the Texas statute
violated several fundamental personal rights.16 John Hallford, a Texas
physician who performed abortions, later intervened in her case.17 The other
case was brought by John and Mary Doe, a married couple who did not have
and did not want children.18 Mrs. Doe had an unspecified medical condition
and had been advised by her physician not to get pregnant or to take birth
control pills; the Does alleged that the Texas abortion statute interfered with
their marital relations because they would be unable to obtain an abortion if
Mrs. Doe became pregnant.19
The cases were consolidated and heard as one before a three-judge
District Court panel.20 The District Court panel found nearly entirely in favor
of Plaintiffs Roe and Hallford.21 The District Court found that the Does
lacked standing to sue and dismissed their case.22 The District Court
declared the statute unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness and
infringement of a woman’s Ninth Amendment right to abortion,23 and it
granted declaratory relief as to Plaintiffs Roe and Hallford.24 The District
Court declined, however, to grant injunctive relief, presumably because the
court assumed that prosecutors would not continue to prosecute an
unconstitutional statute.25
The next day, however, Henry Wade, the Dallas County District
Attorney and eventual defendant in this case, gave a press conference
announcing his intention to continue prosecuting violations of the Texas

16

See Brief for Appellants at 8–9, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 1971
WL 128054, at *8–9 [hereinafter Brief for Appellants].
17
Id. at *12.
18
Id. at *10. The names John and Mary Doe were, of course, pseudonyms. The woman
styled as Mary Doe was, in real life, a friend of Jane Roe’s lead lawyer, Sarah Weddington.
Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of Texas
(retired) (Feb. 18, 2018).
19
Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 10.
20
Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
21
See id. at 1225.
22
Id.
23
The Ninth Amendment provides, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST.
amend. IX. The District Court found that the Ninth Amendment provided protection for
individual rights, including a woman’s right to abortion. See Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1225.
24
Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1225.
25
See id.
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statute, completely disregarding the District Court’s ruling.26 Roe’s lawyer,
Sarah Weddington, later mused that Wade may not have meant to help her
case, but he did—the District Court’s refusal to grant injunctive relief would
not have been appealable to the Supreme Court if Wade had kept his mouth
shut.27
Roe, Hallford, and the Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court on
the grounds that the District Court had erred both in dismissing the Does’
case and denying injunctive relief.28 The State of Texas, through Henry
Wade, also appealed, but was styled as the appellee.29
Appellants’ brief to the Supreme Court advanced several arguments
why the Texas abortion statute should be struck down, two of which were
discussed extensively at oral argument. First, Appellants argued that the
statute abridged their fundamental personal rights by restricting access to
abortion.30
Second, Appellants asserted that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague and indefinite because doctors could not know
whether an abortion which would benefit the woman’s health (physical or
mental) would also necessarily save her life.31 Appellee filed a brief
asserting a lack of standing and justiciability, that the statute was not
overbroad or vague, that the Constitution did not guarantee a woman’s right
to abortion, and that the State of Texas had an interest in prohibiting
abortions except in “limited circumstances.”32 In addition to the parties’
briefs, Justice Harry Blackmun would later bemoan the number of amicus
briefs—there were fifteen33—calling the number “voluminous” and claiming
26

Dave McNeely, Wade to Continue Abortion Trials, DALL. MORNING NEWS, June 19,
1970, at D1.
27
Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018). A failure to grant injunctive relief “in any civil action, suit
or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court
of three judges” may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1948).
28
Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 1–2.
29
It is unclear why, but the parties and the Court consistently used the terms “Appellant”
and “Appellee” in this case, instead of the usual “Petitioner” and “Respondent.”
30
Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 10.
31
Id. at 15.
32
Brief for Appellee at 7–9, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 1971 WL
134281, at *7–9 [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. The full briefs contain numerous arguments
that did not ultimately interest or influence the Justices, as evidenced by the fact that those
arguments were not raised at either of the oral arguments nor did they find their way into the
final opinion. For example, Appellants advanced an argument in their brief that the Texas
abortion statute violated the physician’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and
the presumption of innocence. Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 143. Arguments
asserted in the briefs but not raised at oral argument or included in the majority opinion will
not be discussed extensively in this Article.
33
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973). One author expressed the complaint of a
Chicago lawyer who planned to submit an amicus brief on behalf of 222 physicians, but never
did: “[T]his avalanche of amici briefs will probably go for naught since [the Justices] will not
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that “we’re overwhelmed.”34
B. The First Oral Arguments: December 13, 1971
1. For Appellants Roe, et al.: Sarah Weddington
During the first oral argument, on December 13, 1971, Sarah
Weddington took the podium before the Supreme Court for Appellants.35
Most resources that provide advice to appellate oral advocates stress that an
advocate should be absolutely certain of what he or she is asking for, and
should offer carefully selected reasons that support his or her position.36
Weddington, however, began by reciting the procedural posture of the case,
eventually including the District Court’s two grounds for finding the Texas
abortion statute unconstitutional: “First, that the law was impermissibly
vague, and second, that it violated a woman’s right to continue or terminate
a pregnancy.”37 These two grounds—the vagueness of the statute and a
be able to read them all.” DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 510–11 (1998). By comparison, twenty-nine
briefs were filed in the next major abortion case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Nina Totenberg, Record
Number of Amicus Briefs Filed in Same-Sex-Marriage Cases, NPR (Apr. 28, 2015),
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/04/28/402628280/record-number-ofamicus-briefs-filed-in-same-sex-marriage-cases (noting that there were 148 amicus briefs in
Obergefell and 136 in Sebellius).
34
Oral Argument at 19:58, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-18 [hereinafter Oral Argument II]. Oyez provides a
transcript of oral arguments as well as the audio recording. In this Article, I have, in some
instances, disagreed with and therefore departed from the Oyez transcripts. Naturally, when
transcribing speech, reasonable minds may differ as to the appropriate placement of
punctuation, among other things. See Daniel Libit, Transcribers’ Agony: Frustrated Not by
What Trump Says but How He Says It, CNBC (Aug. 15, 2016),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/15/transcribers-agony-frustrated-not-by-what-trump-saysbut-how-he-says-it.html. I have also generally removed “ums,” “ahs,” and verbal stumbles.
35
Weddington had been the lawyer on the case from its inception and had resisted efforts
from other lawyers to substitute another oral advocate. Telephone Interview with Sarah
Weddington, Professor of History, University of Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018); see also
GARROW, supra note 33, 514–17.
36
Sayler and Shadel advise, “Be selective, both in the quantity of points you make and
also their quality. Get to the main points, prioritize them, and make sure you know when and
how to use them.” ROBERT N. SAYLER & MOLLY BISHOP SHADEL, TONGUE-TIED AMERICA:
REVIVING THE ART OF VERBAL PERSUASION 161 (2d ed. 2011) (emphasis in original). Garner
articulates this point a few different ways, suggesting separately that advocates should “[l]imit
the material [they]’ll try to cover[,]” and should “[f]ormulate the rule for which [their] case
stands—and be willing to show how the rule would apply by analogy to other cases.” BRYAN
A. GARNER, THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT: ENDURING PRINCIPLES WITH SUPPORTING
COMMENTS FROM THE LITERATURE 55, 60 (2d ed. 2009). See also RUGGERO J. ALDISERT,
WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT 325 (2d ed. 2003); DAVID C.
FREDERICK, THE ART OF ORAL ADVOCACY 81 (2003); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 155–56 (2008).
37
Oral Argument at 00:46, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18),
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woman’s right to abortion—formed the two basic themes of the next half
hour, but they were not firmly established theses at the beginning or the end
of her argument.
First, Weddington asserted that the Texas statute, which provided that
abortions could only be performed in order to save the woman’s life, was too
vague:
We submit that a doctor is not used to being restricted to acting
only when it’s for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, and
that health is a continuum which runs into life, and a doctor in our
state does not know whether he can perform an abortion only
when death is imminent, or when the woman’s life would be
shortened. He does not know if the death must be certain, or if it
could be an increase in the probability of her death.38
[I]f a woman comes in alleging that she will commit suicide[,] [i]s
it then necessary for him to do, or can he do an abortion for the
purpose of saving her life?39
During this discussion, Weddington wove in arguments about the standing
of Appellants John and Mary Doe, a married couple who were not and did
not seek to become pregnant,40 and distinguished United States v. Vuitch,41 a
case from the previous term that found a D.C. abortion statute
constitutional.42 Justice Potter Stewart questioned her about the standing of
Appellants John Hallford and Jane Roe, as well.
Throughout, Weddington delivered what amounted to an impassioned
public policy argument for overturning the Texas statute, painting pictures
of women in need,43 and noting that those Texas women who could afford to
were simply traveling to other states to obtain abortions: “It’s so often the
poor and the disadvantaged in Texas who are not able to escape the effect of
the law,” she said.44 She emphasized the impact an unwanted pregnancy
could have on a woman’s body, education, employment, and family life,
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-18 [hereinafter Oral Argument I].
38
Id. at 03:22.
39
Id. at 04:20.
40
Id. at 04:41 (“This brings up the married couple in our case.”).
41
402 U.S. 62 (1971).
42
Id. at 72–73. After the Vuitch decision, “in the District [of Columbia], doctors are able
to exercise their normal matter of judgment, whether or not the health of the woman, mental
or physical, will be affected. But in Texas, we tell the doctor that unless he can decide whether
it’s necessary for the purpose of saving [the woman’s] life, and for no other reason, that he is
subject to criminal sanctions.” Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 03:52.
43
E.g., Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 13:55 (“I think it’s without question that
pregnancy to a woman can completely disrupt her life. Whether she’s unmarried, whether
she’s pursuing an education, whether she’s pursuing a career, whether she has family
problems—all of the problems of personal and family life, for a woman, are bound up in the
problem of abortion.”).
44
Id. at 06:07.
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including legal realities that seem almost bizarre by modern standards: a
pregnant girl or woman could be required to drop out of high school or
college, or be required to quit her job, after which she would be unable to
collect unemployment benefits because the law at the time provided that she
was not eligible for employment.45 “[P]regnancy to a woman is perhaps one
of the most determinative aspects of her life. It disrupts her body, it disrupts
her education, it disrupts her employment, and it often disrupts her entire
family life,” Weddington said.46 Weddington also mentioned, but did not
discuss in much detail, the possibility (and reality) that women would seek
illegal abortions if legal ones were unavailable.47
Seventeen minutes into her allotted half-hour, Justice Stewart rather
pointedly said, “I trust you are going to get to what provisions of the
Constitution you rely on.”48 Weddington floundered a bit, suggesting—in
less than two minutes—the Ninth Amendment, then citing a law review
article and common law precedent, then referencing Griswold v. Connecticut
and the Ninth Amendment again, before finally offering the liberty interest
of the Fourteenth Amendment.49 Justice Stewart replied, “And anything else
that might be applicable.” Weddington laughingly agreed.50 She could
not—or would not—commit to a specific constitutional provision that would
establish such a right.51 At one point, she essentially admitted that she was
not asserting a concrete position, but spun this as modesty: noting that the
Griswold Court was “obviously divided” on where the right to privacy rests,
she said, “I’m a little reluctant to aspire to a wisdom that the Court was not
in agreement on.”52 The humility here is perhaps understandable, but it again
underscores a fundamental weakness of the oral argument, that Weddington
was not articulating a clear legal standard by which the Court could grant the
relief she was requesting.
Forty-five years later, Weddington herself remains bothered by this
exchange. She knows her answer did not hit a home run, but each
constitutional provision was included for the benefit of a specific Justice, and
she did not then—and does not now—feel she could have safely omitted any
options or committed herself more specifically.53
45

Id. at 14:17.
Id. at 15:41.
47
Id. at 12:45.
48
Id. at 17:21.
49
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 17:33.
50
Id. at 19:27.
51
See id. at 19:16 (“We had originally brought the suit alleging [violations of] . . . the
Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, the Ninth Amendment, and a variety of
others.”).
52
Id. at 18:17.
53
Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of
46
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The Court’s final majority opinion ultimately articulates the
constitutional rights of the woman, the lack of constitutional rights of the
unborn fetus, and the State’s interests in regulating the procedure for the
protection of the woman’s health and for preserving fetal life.54 Weddington
was not quite able to tease these interests apart and discuss them with
confidence. For example:
Justice Byron White: The right you insist on [for a woman to
choose an abortion] reaches right up to the time of birth?
Weddington: The Constitution, as I read it, and as interpreted and
documented by Professor Means, attaches protection to the person
at the time of birth.55
Here, Weddington confused a question about the rights of the woman with
the rights of the fetus.
Twenty-two minutes into the argument, Justice White raised the
possibility that the length of the pregnancy might be significant: he asked
whether “the statute doesn’t make any distinction based upon what period of
pregnancy the abortion is performed.”56 This point had not been raised in
the briefs, but historically the legality of an abortion often hinged on whether
it was performed before or after “quickening” of the fetus.57
Weddington answered accurately that no, the statute did not distinguish
based on the length of a pregnancy,58 but a few minutes later, she said,
“Obviously I have a much more difficult time saying that the [S]tate has no
interest in late pregnancy.”59 Justice White jumped on this: “Why? Why is
that?” Weddington was again rather inarticulate in her response, saying, “I
think it is more the emotional response to a late pregnancy rather than it is
any constitutional [reason].”60
Making concessions as an advocate is a tricky business. Doing so may
build credibility with the bench, but on the other hand, an advocate does not
want to give away the case. “Know what you can and can’t concede,”
advises Bryan A. Garner.61 And with his coauthor Justice Antonin Scalia,
“Beware”: “Any judge who presses you for a concession might well use it
against you.”62 Each advocate at the Roe oral arguments made a key
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018).
54
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158–63 (1973).
55
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 24:02.
56
Id. at 22:28.
57
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 132–39. “Quickening” is “the first recognizable movement of a
fetus in utero, usually appearing from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy.” Id. at 132.
58
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 22:36.
59
Id. at 23:34.
60
Id. at 23:42.
61
GARNER, supra note 36, at 191.
62
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 199. The authors also caution against conceding
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concession that was, in fact, used against them. This was Weddington’s:
conceding that the State could have greater interest in late pregnancy than in
early. As Justice Scalia and Garner predicted, the Court indeed used the
concession against Appellants, since the final opinion concluded that the
State has a compelling interest in regulating abortion after the end of the first
trimester.
Throughout the first oral argument, Weddington demonstrated broad
mastery of the subject matter.63 In addition to discussing abortion and related
statistics in Texas and around the nation, she was able to answer a wide
variety of questions from the bench, including questions on standing,64
declaratory judgment law in Texas,65 and whether unborn children can
recover in other contexts, such as through inheritance and in tort.66 In one
exchange with Justice White, Weddington was able to cite to an Iowa
Supreme Court case that had been handed down only two weeks before.67
Overall, Weddington demonstrated mastery of case law, having apparently
prepared for every question the Justices might ask, with the exception that
she proffered no definitive position on where the Constitution protects a right
to an abortion.68
Though her voice remained confident throughout, her word choices
suggested that she was not entirely sure what she was arguing for: “It is our
position that [pause] the freedom involved is that of a woman to determine
whether or not to continue a pregnancy.”69 As Weddington drew to a close,
she recapped rather weakly: “I think perhaps we would stress that there are
two separate actions before the Court: first, that of the women, and second,
that of the doctor.”70

points that are not in the briefs. Id. at 200.
63
Oral argument guides are unanimous that thorough preparation is essential. See, e.g.,
ALDISERT, supra note 36, at 333, 340, 342–43, FREDERICK, supra note 36, at 15; SAYLER &
SHADEL, supra note 36, at 160; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 150.
64
E.g., Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 25:47.
65
Id. at 11:32.
66
Id. at 32:40.
67
Id. at 33:36.
68
Weddington had conducted a moot court only a few days before the first oral
argument, and she gave tickets to the oral argument as thank you gifts for the lawyers who
had played the justices. Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History,
University of Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018). Conventional wisdom holds that moot courts
are “mandatory” for advocates. See ALDISERT, supra note 36, at 327; see also GARNER, supra
note 36, at 45; FREDERICK, supra note 36, at 75; SAYLOR & SHADEL, supra note 36, at 160;
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 158.
69
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 23:25.
70
Id. at 28:26.
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2. For Appellee Wade: Jay Floyd
If Weddington lacked a mantra during her portion of the first oral
argument, Wade’s advocate, Jay Floyd, appeared hapless.71 When he took
the podium, Floyd, an Assistant Attorney General, attempted to ingratiate
himself with the Justices by saying, “It’s an old joke, but when a man argues
against two beautiful ladies like this, they are going to have the last word.”72
If Floyd was expecting knowing chuckles from the men on the bench,
he was disappointed. There was absolute silence in the courtroom.73 Floyd’s
opening gambit is now an actual textbook example of what not to do at oral
argument: in their book on successful appellate advocacy, Justice Scalia and
Garner warn, “Never tell prepared jokes,” and cite this example for their
reasoning.74 The audio recording evidences complete silence after Floyd’s
remark,75 and observers who were in the courtroom reported that Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger stared disapprovingly at Floyd.76 Sarah
Weddington later quipped that she thought Floyd “had argued too many
cases in rural Texas, where a little humor would have been received better.”77
“The general rule . . . is that humor is for the court and not the
advocates[,]”78 and indeed, the most amusing moments of the oral arguments
were at the advocates’ expense.79 Floyd hustled away from his opening faux
pas by launching into a lengthy assertion that neither Roe nor the Does had
standing to bring suit.80 He argued that the Does did not have standing
because they were not pregnant,81 but then incongruously asserted that Roe
lost her standing when she became pregnant, saying, “I think she makes her
choice prior to the time she becomes pregnant.”82 Justice White retorted,
71
See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 6, at 180–81; see also FREDERICK, supra note 36,
at 169 (“Have a Mantra.”).
72
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 34:17. Floyd was referring to Weddington and her
co-counsel, Linda Coffee. Of course, as appellants who reserved time for rebuttal,
Weddington and Coffee would have the last word, their beauty notwithstanding.
73
Id. at 34:24.
74
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 186–87; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Was
“Beautiful Ladies” Comment in Roe v. Wade the Worst Courtroom Humor of All Time?,
A.B.A J. (July 30, 2013, 11:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/was_comment
_in_roe_v._wade_the_worst_courtroom_humor_of_all_time/.
75
See Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 34:24.
76
GARROW, supra note 33, at 525–26.
77
Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018).
78
FREDERICK, supra note 36, at 189.
79
For example, during Weddington’s argument, Justice Stewart suggested that she was
asserting any and all constitutional provisions that might apply, and Weddington laughingly
agreed. See supra text accompanying note 50.
80
See Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 34:45.
81
Id. at 37:40.
82
Id. at 41:55.

CHRISTOPHER (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

NEVERTHELESS SHE PERSISTED

12/17/2018 4:04 PM

319

“Maybe she makes her choice when she lives in Texas,” and the courtroom
erupted in laughter.83 As the laughter peaked, Floyd, sounding affronted
(though he may have been affecting it), asked, “May I proceed?”84 After the
laughter died down, he suggested, “There is no restriction on moving,” but
that line did not get an audible reaction.85
When asked by Justice Thurgood Marshall what the State’s interest was
in regulating abortion, Floyd bumbled a bit before reciting that the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals had ruled that the State’s interest was in the
protection of fetal life.86 He hinted that the State had an interest in protecting
the health of the woman, but never said so directly. Instead, Floyd said he
was not convinced by the information on the record that abortion is safer
than childbirth, nor that women do not experience emotional problems after
having an abortion.87 He did not explain how his personal skepticism about
the medical evidence affects the constitutional analysis at hand.
As happened in the half-hour before (and would happen again during
the reargument), the Justices extracted an important concession when Floyd
was forced to admit that “I don’t think the courts have come to the conclusion
that the unborn has full juristic rights. . . . I just don’t feel like they have, at
the present time.”88 Again here, Floyd phrases this as a personal belief rather
than a fact, which probably did not help his credibility with the bench.
Throughout the oral argument, Floyd seemed to articulate numerous
positions that contradicted each other. In addition to his assertion that neither
pregnant nor non-pregnant women had standing, he alternately argued that
life begins at conception, but he did not know when life began for the
purposes of the abortion statute, saying, “Mr. Justice, there are unanswerable
questions in this field”—again, to audible chuckling in the gallery.89

83

Id. at 42:15.
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 42:23.
85
Id. at 42:33.
86
Id. at 47:50.
87
Id. at 53:33 (“The protection of the mother, at one time, may still be the primary
[purpose of the abortion statute], but the policy considerations, Mr. Justice, would seem to me
to be for the State legislature to make a decision.”).
88
Id. at 55:10.
89
Id. at 56:23. Justice Marshall: “[Does the fetus have rights i]n the first few weeks of
pregnancy?” Floyd: “At any time, Mr. Justice. We make no distinctions in our statute.”
Justice Marshall: “You make no distinctions whether there’s life there or not?” Floyd: “We
say there is life from the moment of impregnation.” Justice Marshall: “And do you have any
scientific data to support that?” Floyd: “Well, we begin, Mr. Justice, in our brief, with the
development of the human embryo, carrying it through to the development of the fetus from
about seven to nine days after conception.” Justice Marshall: “Well, what about six days?”
Floyd: “We don’t know.” Justice Marshall: “But the statute goes all the way back to one
hour?” Floyd: “I don’t . . . Mr. Justice, there are unanswerable questions in this field.” Id. at
55:31.
84
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The strongest part of Floyd’s argument comes in the waning minutes.
He correctly summarized Appellant’s constitutional assertions as “the
individual, or marital right of privacy . . . or the right to choose whether or
not to abort a child.”90 He then made a strong point that
neither individual nor marital privacy has been held to be absolute.
We have legal search and seizure. We have [criminalized] the
possession of illegal drugs, the practice of polygamy, and other
matters . . . . As far as the freedom over one’s body is concerned,
this is not absolute, the use of illicit drugs, the indecent exposure
legislation[.]91
Close listening suggests that Floyd read the case law, but that he was
prone to making bone-headed remarks that strained his credibility. In
responding to questions from the bench, Floyd said in one instance, “I say, I
have no authority to support this position, but it would appear . . . .”92 and a
minute later, “Let me answer your question with a statement, if I may.”93
When questioned about the purposes behind the Texas abortion statute,
Floyd was only able to speculate. He said, “This is just from my—I speak
personally, [inaudible] I would think that even when this statute was first
passed, there was some concern for the unborn fetus.”94 Justice Harry A.
Blackmun pointed out, “Apart from your personal attitude, your court has
spoken on the intent of the statute, has it not?”95 Floyd replied, “Yes,” but
did not say more; he was unable to utilize legal precedent to establish his
point.96 When asked how to reconcile seemingly inconsistent Texas court
opinions on whose interests are at stake, Floyd’s response not only sounded
ill-informed, but also undermined his own position: “Well, as I say, Your
Honor, I don’t think the courts have come to the conclusion that the unborn
has full juristic rights. Not yet. Maybe they will. I don’t know. I just don’t
feel like they have, at the present time.”97 This, of course, is precisely what
Floyd was asking the U.S. Supreme Court to determine, that a fetus is a
person and has constitutional rights.
Overall, Floyd comes across as rather bumbling, inconsistent, and light
on the existing law and how it applied to this case, despite having brought a
detailed outline of what he planned to cover during oral argument.98
Although technically the Appellee—Roe had appealed the one claim denied
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 57:37.
Id. at 58:20.
Id. at 40:40.
Id. at 41:38.
Id. at 54:13.
Id. at 54:49.
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 54:55.
Id. at 55:09.
GARROW, supra note 33 at 526.
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by the District Court—the state of Texas had also appealed the ruling.99
Floyd should have been arguing zealously that the District Court erred in
finding the Texas statute unconstitutional. He should have argued that the
District Court was incorrect, both because the Texas abortion statute was not
vague and because there was no constitutional right to abortion. Instead,
Floyd spent the first half of his time at the podium arguing that Appellants
lacked standing, and a significant portion in the middle of his time discussing
(inaccurately) which party appealed where.100
3. Rebuttal
Oral argument best-practices suggest that the best use of rebuttal time
is to “respond to the appellee’s presentation, not to rehash your argument in
chief.”101 Then-lawyer, now Chief Justice, John Roberts has been quoted as
advising, “Only go for home runs” during rebuttal.102
During her brief rebuttal in the first Roe oral argument, Weddington did
respond to Floyd’s presentation, but it was not exactly a home run: she
pointed out that, contrary to Floyd’s assertion minutes before, Appellee had
filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.103 The point was hardly one that
pinned Floyd to the mat, but it was an attempt to demonstrate further that
Floyd was not in control of the argument he was making to the Court. Given
Floyd’s hapless performance, Weddington’s point on rebuttal was probably
redundant.
C. The Second Oral Arguments: October 11, 1972
A few months after the December 1971 oral arguments, the Court
ordered reargument, despite the fact that a five-person majority seemed
already secured.104 Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger pushed for
the reargument, while Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall opposed the
idea.105
Various rationales have been offered for the Court’s order for
reargument, including that the case was clearly an important one and that the
advocates had been unhelpful during the first argument.106 In addition, there
had only been seven Justices on the Court during the first argument and two
99

Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 1:02:38.
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 45:12–47:39; see also infra text accompanying
note 103.
101
ALDISERT, supra note 36, at 378.
102
FREDERICK, supra note 36, at 125.
103
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 1:02:37.
104
EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 6, at 185–86; GARROW, supra note 33, at 553.
105
Joseph F. Kobylka, Tales from the Blackmun Papers: A Fuller Appreciation of Harry
Blackmun’s Judicial Legacy, 70 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1087 (2005).
106
EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 6, at 185–86.
100
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more had since been seated.107
The more provocative possibility—though purely rumor—is that
President Nixon requested that the Supreme Court delay its decision in Roe
v. Wade until after Nixon’s 1972 reelection campaign.108 President Nixon
had appointed Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun to the Court fairly
early in his presidency, and it was these two Justices who pushed for
reargument. After the first oral arguments, Nixon would go on to appoint
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., but they were not yet on
the Court when the decision was made to order reargument in Roe.109
Whatever the rationale, the Court ordered reargument and also
requested briefing on the issue of whether the right to abortion changes as
pregnancy progresses.110 Appellants did not address this question in their
supplemental brief and Appellee did not file a supplemental brief.111
1. For Appellants Roe, et al.: Sarah Weddington
During the second oral argument on October 11, 1972, Sarah
Weddington again argued for Appellants, bringing up constitutional grounds
for the right to an abortion six minutes into her argument.112 Relying on the
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, along with “a great body of
precedent[,]”113 she then referenced a variety of Supreme Court cases related
to the right to privacy:
The Court has in the past, for example, held that it is the right of
the parents and of the individual to determine whether or not they
will send their child to private school, whether or not their children
will be taught foreign languages, whether or not they will have
offspring—the Skinner case—whether the right to determine for
themselves whom they will marry—the Loving case—and even in
Boddie versus Connecticut, the choice saying that marriage itself
is so important that the state cannot interfere with termination of
a marriage just because the woman is unable to pay the cost.
107

GARROW, supra note 33, at 553, 537–38. Justices John M. Harlan II and Hugo L.
Black left the Court in September 1971, a few months before the first oral argument in Roe.
See Justices, OYEZ, www.oyez.org/justices (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
108
Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018). In a memo among the Justices, Justice Douglas—who
opposed reargument—wrote, “If the vote of the Conference is to reargue, then I will file a
statement telling what is happening to us and the tragedy it entails.” GARROW, supra note 33,
at 553–54. We do not know precisely what he was referring to, however. Justice Douglas
considered writing a dissent to the order for reargument, but ultimately did not. Id. at 555–
56.
109
GARROW, supra note 33, at 553, 537–38.
110
JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 23.
111
EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 6, at 189.
112
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 06:34.
113
Id. at 06:41.
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Griswold, of course, is the primary case, holding that the state
could not interfere in the question of whether or not a married
couple would use birth control and, since then, the courts—this
Court, of course, has held that the individual has the right to
determine, whether they are married or single, whether they would
use birth control. So, there is a great body of cases decided in the
past by this Court in the areas of marriage, sex, contraception,
procreation, childbearing, and education of children which says
that there are certain things that are so much part of the individual
concern that they should be left to the determination of the
individual.114
Weddington spoke virtually uninterrupted for thirteen full minutes.115
Looking back on the two sets of oral arguments, Weddington says the
Justices were far less engaged the second time; it was as if their minds were
already made up.116
As the Justices attempted to raise hypotheticals, Weddington
consistently refused to engage, repeatedly asking them only to rule on the
statute before them. Appellate argument frequently revolves around
hypothetical questions from the bench, and the standard advice for oral
advocates is to answer them: “Willingly answer hypotheticals. Appellate
courts are concerned not only with the outcome of your case but also with
how their ruling will affect the law generally.”117 During the second oral
argument, Weddington was much firmer in asking for the relief she requested
than during her first oral argument, but her commitment to the relief
requested translated into a near-refusal to answer the Justices’ hypotheticals.
For example:
Justice Burger: Do you make any distinction between the first
month and the ninth month of gestation?
Weddington: Our statute does not.
Justice Burger: Do you, in your position in this case?
Weddington: We are asking in this case that the Court declare the
statute unconstitutional, the [S]tate having proved no compelling
interest at all.118
Weddington did not abandon the strong public policy arguments she
relied upon during the first oral argument. She referred to pregnancy as “an

114

Id. at 07:08.
The first substantive question came from Justice Stewart after approximately thirteen
and a half minutes. Id. at 13:33.
116
Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018).
117
GARNER, supra note 36, at 167; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 155,
194–95.
118
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 16:49.
115
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irreparable injury” and continued on in that vein for some time.119 Though
criticized by some as failing to assert constitutional bases for the right to
abortion, this theme of pregnancy-as-injury addressed the standing issues
that Appellee hammered so hard during the first oral argument.
During the second set of oral arguments, the Justices again elicited
important—and matching—concessions from the advocates. Justice Stewart
asked Weddington, “If it were established that an unborn fetus is a person
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, you would have an
almost impossible case here, would you not?”120 She replied, with some
laughter in her voice, “I would have a very difficult case.”121 This
concession, however, was one that ultimately was not used against the
advocate’s position in the final opinion.
2. For Appellee Wade: Robert Flowers
Jay Floyd did not return to the Supreme Court for the second oral
arguments on October 11, 1972. Instead, his immediate supervisor in the
Attorney General’s office, Robert Flowers, argued for Appellee.122 The
thesis of his argument, indeed nearly the entire content of the thirty minutes
he spent at the podium, was that a fetus is a person, leaving largely unsaid
the legal consequence that fetal personhood means a woman has no right to
an abortion.123 He attempted to impress upon the Justices that pregnancy,
and thus personhood, is a medical truth: “[T]he Court must take . . . the
medical research and apply it to our Constitution as best it can.”124
Yet when specifically asked, Flowers admitted he had no medical
evidence to support his thesis of fetal personhood:
Justice Marshall: I want you to give me a . . . recognizable medical
writing of any kind that says that at the time of conception that the
fetus is a person.
Flowers: I do not believe that I could give that to you without
researching through the briefs that have been filed in this case,
Your Honor. I’m not sure that I can give it to you after research.125
119

Id. at 09:48.
Id. at 24:03.
121
Id. at 24:13.
122
GARROW, supra note 33, at 569.
123
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 26:45.
124
Id. at 43:56. It is an old joke, but if lawyers could do math, they would have become
doctors.
125
Id. at 45:46. Justice Rehnquist attempted to assist Flowers in finding medical
authority, asking, “Did Judge Campbell rely on medical authorities in that statement you’re
summarizing?” Flowers replied, “Yes, sir, he did.” Id. at 46:14. Flowers, however, was still
unable to provide Justice Marshall with citations to relevant medical authorities. Flowers:
“Now, I know he doesn’t address himself, Your Honor, to the moment of conception.” Justice
Marshall: “I didn’t think so.” Id. at 48:51.
120
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In fact, Flowers’s medical evidence explained the progression of fetal
development, but did not articulate when life began.126 Moreover, when
pressed, Flowers backed away from his emphasis on medical certainty:
Justice Stewart: You think it’s basically a medical question?
Flowers: From a constitutional standpoint, no, sir.127
Justice Blackmun: Is it not true, or is it true, that the medical
profession itself is not in agreement as to when life begins?
Flowers: I think that’s true, sir. But from a layman’s standpoint,
medically speaking, we would say that at the moment of
conception, from the chromosomes, every potential that anybody
in this room has is present from the moment of conception.128
Unable to make a cohesive medical argument for personhood, Flowers
conceded early in the argument that he was unaware of any cases that hold a
fetus is a person.129 Yet ten minutes later, he articulated several cases where
courts had identified tort rights of fetuses.130 His inability to make the
connection in a more timely manner weakened his position and his
credibility—he appeared unable to draw connections between his assertions
and, by extension, unable to understand their implications.
Flowers argued consistently that life (by which he meant personhood)
begins at conception, yet he was unable to offer any medical or legal
evidence to support his argument. Lacking evidentiary support, Flowers
turned to the emotional:
This Court has been diligent in protecting the rights of the
minorities, and gentlemen, we say that this is a minority, a silent
minority, the true silent minority. Who is speaking for these
children? Where is the counsel for these unborn children, whose
life is being taken? Where is the safeguard of the right to trial by
jury? Are we to place this power in the hands of a mother? In a
doctor?131 I think that, possibly, we have an opportunity to make
one of the worst mistakes here that we’ve ever made.132
As the other advocates did before him, Flowers made a key concession:
Justice White: You’ve lost your case, then, if the fetus or the
embryo is not a person, is that it?

126

E.g., id. at 44:43.
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 27:57.
128
Id. at 30:52.
129
Id. at 28:15.
130
Id. at 38:38 (citing Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), abrogated by
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v.
Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964); Jones v. Jones, 144 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Sup. Ct. 1955)).
131
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 41:52. Flowers consistently referred to fetuses as
“children” and pregnant women as “mothers.” See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
132
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 44:12.
127
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Flowers: Yes sir, I would say so.133
During the oral argument, Flowers appears to have been quite
unprepared. He answered numerous questions from the bench with
responses such as, “I would think so,”134 and “I would assume so.”135
Flowers ran out of material several minutes early, thanking the Justices in a
farewell tone of voice before they peppered him with a few more
questions.136 The comments leading up to Flowers’s thanks, which were
presumably his closing remarks, are so vague as to be almost nonsensical:
In this whole field of abortion here we have, on the one hand, a
great clamoring for this liberization [sic] of it. Perhaps this is
good. Population explosion, we have so many things that are
arriving on the scene in the past few years that might have some
effect on producing this type of legislature [sic], rather than facing
the facts squarely. I don’t think anyone has faced the fact in
making a decision whether this is a life, in a person concept.137
Flowers admitted later that he was unprepared, and that he had not even made
notes about what he wanted to cover during the argument.138
3. Rebuttal
After Flowers’s haphazard performance, Weddington retook the
podium139 and hit a few home runs. Using Flowers’s admissions against him,
Weddington asserted that if there was no proof of when life begins or that
the statute was designed to protect fetal life, then the decision to continue a
pregnancy must be a decision that “is so fundamentally a part of individual
life of the family, of such fundamental impact on the person[.]”140
Justice White, stammering a bit, said, “[Y]our argument, as the way
you state it, is that it wouldn’t make any difference what part of pregnancy
the [S]tate would [prevent] the abortion—[i]t will still be
unconstitutional.”141 Weddington replied calmly, “At this time, there is no
indication to show that the Constitution would give any protection [to a fetus]
prior to birth,”142 and that the Texas abortion statute “certainly is void
133

Id. at 36:38. Flowers responded so quickly and readily it seems likely he did not
understand what he was being asked. Id.
134
E.g., id. at 33:56.
135
Id. at 38:13.
136
Id. at 52:15.
137
Id. at 51:25.
138
GARROW, supra note 33, at 569.
139
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 55:28.
140
Id. at 55:43. Weddington was interrupted before she finished her sentence, but her
point was made. Id.
141
Id. at 56:22.
142
Id. at 56:36.
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because it infringes upon the fundamental right at a time when the [S]tate
can show no compelling interest early in pregnancy.”143 Weddington also
addressed several of Flowers’s contentions concisely:
No one is more keenly aware of the gravity of the issues or the
moral implications of this case, but it is a case that must be decided
on the Constitution. We do not disagree that there is a progression
of fetal development. It is the conclusion to be drawn from that,
upon which we disagree. We are not here to advocate abortion.
We do not ask this Court to rule that abortion is good or desirable
in any particular situation. We are here to advocate that the
decision as to whether or not a particular woman will continue to
carry or will terminate a pregnancy is a decision that should be
made by that individual.144
All in all, the second set of oral arguments somewhat refined the
possible grounds on which a woman’s right to an abortion might or might
not be protected by the Constitution, but it did not provide new arguments or
evidence from the State that fetuses have constitutional rights, nor did it flesh
out the State’s interests in regulating abortions.
After both sets of oral arguments, Weddington wrote, “I think we are
going to win this case. Not sure what grounds or how good the opinion will
be, but [I] really think we’ll win.”145 Her uncertainty about what the grounds
would be was warranted, since she had presented the Court with a wide
variety of possible Constitutional arguments without advocating for one in
particular.
III. TRACING THE OPINION
Sarah Weddington’s prediction,146 that Appellants would win the case,
proved (mostly) true: the Supreme Court struck down the Texas abortion
statute as unconstitutional and largely affirmed the District Court’s
rulings.147 She was also right to be cautious about what the grounds would
be, because the majority opinion announced rules no one had anticipated.
Justice Blackmun wrote for a seven-person majority. The text of the
majority opinion is fifty-one pages long in the United States Reports.148
Following a brief introduction, the majority opinion proceeded in twelve
parts.

143

Id. at 58:07.
Id. at 01:01:21.
145
See GARROW, supra note 33, at 573.
146
Id.
147
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166–67 (1973). The Supreme Court reversed the District
Court’s determination that Hallford had standing. Id.
148
Excluding the Court’s syllabus and recitation of the attorneys.
144
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In the introductory paragraphs, the opinion acknowledged the swirling
storm that the abortion debate engenders in the United States, and identified
“the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy . . . the
vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and . . . the deep and
seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires.”149
The introduction also noted that “population growth, pollution, poverty,
and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem.”150
These points had not been addressed in any of the briefs, but were addressed
at oral argument. Weddington had stressed the impact of the law on “the
poor and the disadvantaged in Texas” during the first oral argument,151 and
Flowers referred to “population explosion” during the second oral
argument.152 No brief or oral argument, however, mentioned a disparate
impact of the abortion laws on women of different races, and the opinion did
not go on to analyze the “racial overtones” it casually mentioned.
Part I recited the Texas statutes at issue, noting that the statutes have
been “substantially unchanged” since the 1850s and that “[s]imilar statutes
are in existence in a majority of the States.”153 Part II reviewed the identities
of Appellants Jane Roe, John and Mary Doe, and James Hallford, as well as
recited the procedural posture of the case.154 Part III consists of a single
paragraph, which explains that the Court will hear both the declaratory and
injunctive aspects of the case.155
In Part IV, the Court addressed the standing of the four Appellants.156
Given that this subject took up such a significant part of the oral
arguments,157 the Court disposed of this issue rather quickly, in just a couple
of pages apiece. Roe was found to have standing, given that “there can be
little dispute that [her case] then presented a case or controversy and that,
wholly apart from the class aspects, she, as a pregnant single woman
thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws, had standing to challenge
those statutes.”158 These points were made in Appellants’ brief159 as well as
at oral argument, though in both instances Appellants emphasized the class
149

Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
Id.
151
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 06:07.
152
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 51:43.
153
Roe, 410 U.S. at 118.
154
Id. at 120–22.
155
Id. at 123.
156
Id. at 123–29.
157
See supra text accompanying notes 40–43, 64, 80–82, 89, 100.
158
Roe, 410 U.S. at 124. The Court acknowledged that were it to hold otherwise,
pregnancy-related claims “truly could be ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’” Id. at
125 (citations omitted).
159
Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 54.
150
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action nature of Roe’s case more than the Court did in finding standing.160
The majority went on to find that neither Dr. Hallford nor the Does had
standing: Dr. Hallford did not have standing because his relief regarding
pending or possible criminal prosecution must be in state courts,161 and the
Does did not have standing because the Court was “not prepared to say that
the bare allegation of so indirect an injury [wa]s sufficient to present an
actual case or controversy.”162 Here, the Court adopted the points made by
Appellee in its brief and at oral argument.163
Part V of the majority opinion is a single paragraph, which served as a
kind of transition into the next section. Part V summarized Roe’s argument:
that [the Texas statutes] improperly invade a right, said to be
possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her
pregnancy. Appellant would discover this right in the concept of
personal ‘liberty’ embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual
privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras;
or among those rights reserved to the people by the Ninth
Amendment.164
This is a concise recitation of the points Weddington raised at oral argument
and in her brief in support of a woman’s right to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy.165 Appellants asserted, in their brief and at oral arguments, that
the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague, but the majority did not
reach that argument.166
Part VI is the longest section of the opinion, at just over seventeen
pages, in which the Court reviewed the history of laws and attitudes about

160
Compare Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 54, and Oral Argument I, supra note
37, at 10:34 (emphasizing the class action), with Roe, 410 U.S. at 124–25 (no reliance on the
class to find standing). The Court did not analyze whether Roe could have had standing to
challenge a criminal statute to which she could not have been subject; the Texas abortion
statute criminalized the behavior of doctors performing abortions, not women receiving them.
161
Roe, 410 U.S. at 126.
162
Id. at 128 (citations omitted).
163
Brief for Appellee, supra note 32, at 12; Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 34:27
(Does’s standing), 42:38 (Hallford’s standing).
164
Roe, 410 U.S. at 129 (citations omitted).
165
Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 91–124; Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at
17:33.
166
Compare Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 125, and Oral Argument I, supra note
37, at 05:20 (arguing that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague), with Roe, 410 U.S. at 164
(declining to consider the vagueness argument). Appellants’ brief also contained an argument
that the Texas abortion statutes violated a doctor’s right to presumed innocence and the
privilege against self-incrimination by placing the burden of proving the medical necessity of
the abortion on the doctor. Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 140. This argument was
not mentioned at the oral arguments and it does not appear in any of the final opinions in the
case.
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abortion.167 Taking a very long historical view, the majority described the
hundred-plus years of American abortion restriction laws to be “of relatively
recent vintage.”168 The majority reviewed abortion practices and attitudes in
the Persian, Roman, and Greek Empires, as well as the history of the
Hippocratic Oath, which dates from about 400 B.C., and in some translations
contains language that the doctor will not perform or assist in the
procurement of abortions.169
Part VI continued by analyzing how English and American common
law placed restrictions on abortions performed after “quickening,” but not
before.170 This may be one of the Court’s inspirations for ultimately
concluding that the state’s interest in protecting fetal life matures at viability,
though the majority opinion uses “viability” rather than “quickening” as the
relevant point in time.171 Later English statutory laws generally preserved
the distinction between abortions performed before and after quickening,
though these laws also introduced the exception that abortions after
quickening were permissible to save the life of the mother.172 American
statutes, comparatively, which were first passed in the decades following the
Civil War, retained the exception for abortions performed to save the
woman’s life, but “the quickening distinction disappeared[.]”173
The briefs contain comparatively little on the history of abortion.
Appellants’ brief spent only a few paragraphs on the history of anti-abortion
statutes in the 1800s, but in less detail than the majority opinion.174 Neither
the Appellee’s brief nor the Appellants’ supplemental brief addressed the
history of abortion.175 Justice Blackmun, the author of the majority, had
signaled his interest in this historical perspective several times during the
second oral argument. For example, he questioned Flowers: “When you
quote Blackstone, is it not true that in Blackstone’s time abortion was not a
felony?”176 And later:

167

Roe, 410 U.S. at 129–47.
Id. at 129.
169
Id. at 130–31.
170
Id. at 132–36 (English common law), 138–39 (American common law).
171
Id. at 163–64 (announcing the trimester framework). Justice Blackmun admitted in a
conference memo that the end of the first trimester timeframe is “arbitrary, but perhaps any
other selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary[.]” JOHNSON, supra
note 2, at 71.
172
Roe, 410 U.S. at 136–38.
173
Id. at 139. The majority opinion also reviewed the positions of the American Medical
Association, the American Public Health Association, and the American Bar Association on
abortion procedures. Id. at 143–47 n.40.
174
Compare Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 34–35, with Roe, 410 U.S. at 138–39.
175
See Oral Argument I, supra note 37; Oral Argument II, supra note 34.
176
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 30:24.
168
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Justice Blackmun: Do you know as a matter of historical fact when
most of these abortion statutes came on the books?
Flowers: I think it was—most of them were in the mid-1800s,
Your Honor.
Justice Blackmun: In fact, the latter half of the 19th century. Do
you know why they all came on them at that time?
Flowers: No, sir, I surely don’t. I’m sorry.177
During the second oral argument, Justice Blackmun also questioned
Weddington about the Hippocratic Oath, asking why it had not been
discussed in her brief.178 Weddington explained—appropriately—that the
content of the Hippocratic Oath did not define constitutional rights in the
United States, but Justice Blackmun persisted, both at oral argument179 and
by including the Hippocratic Oath in the opinion.180 His interest in the
Hippocratic Oath may reflect his personal attachment to the medical field;
he served as counsel to the Mayo Clinic during this period.181
Part VII analyzed Texas’s asserted reasons behind the criminal abortion
statute. At oral arguments, the advocates struggled to articulate the
legislative rationales. During the first oral argument, Floyd offered both the
interest in protecting fetal life182 and in protecting the health of the woman,183
but he was not authoritative on either point: “This is just from my—I speak
personally, if I may, I would think that even when this statute was first
passed, there was some concern for the unborn fetus.”184 Weddington
asserted that there was no legislative history regarding the Texas law and
that “the only legislative history . . . is that which is found in other states . . .
that these statutes were adopted for the health of the mother.”185 Weddington
had criticized the State’s inability to “point to any authority, of any nature
whatsoever, that would demonstrate that this statute was, in fact, adopted for
[the] purpose [of protecting the life of the fetus].”186
The Court nevertheless identified state interests behind the abortion
statutes, critiquing each in turn. First, the Court acknowledged the State’s
rationale “to discourage illicit sexual conduct,” but dismissed this out of
hand, writing that “it appears that no court or commentator has taken th[is]
177

Id. at 53:43.
Id. at 19:46.
179
Id. at 59:43.
180
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130–31 (1973).
181
Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018); see also infra Part IV.A.3.
182
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 48:20.
183
Id. at 53:34.
184
Id. at 54:13.
185
Id. at 20:53.
186
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 12:37.
178
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argument seriously.”187 Second, the Court acknowledged the State’s
“concern[] with abortion as a medical procedure[,]” but finds that
“[m]ortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where the
procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower than the rates for normal
childbirth.”188 The safety of the abortion procedure was emphasized by
Appellants in both briefs and at both oral arguments.189 Third, the Court
analyzed “the State’s interest—some phrase it in terms of duty—in
protecting prenatal life.”190 Appellee stressed the importance of protecting
fetal life in the brief and at both oral arguments.191 The Court, however,
pointed out that legislative history does not support this view and notes that
“the pregnant woman herself could not be prosecuted for self-abortion or for
cooperating in an abortion performed upon her by another.”192 Weddington
had hammered that last point at both oral arguments: if the abortion statute
was designed to protect fetal life, it made no sense that a pregnant woman
who received an abortion (or even performed one on herself) was not
liable.193
Part VIII is the beginning of the “meat and potatoes” of the Roe
majority opinion. Here, the Court acknowledged a constitutionally protected
right to privacy, and concluded that the right “is broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”194
Strangely, the Court did not announce where in the Constitution the right to
privacy is founded, writing instead that the Court “fe[lt]” the right was
located “in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty” but
acknowledged—without exactly disagreeing—that the District Court found
the right to be located in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the
people.195 Here, the Court acknowledged “[t]he detriment that the State
would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying her this choice
altogether”:196
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring,
187

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148 (1973).
Id. at 148–49.
189
Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 10, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 7018), 1972 WL 126044, at *10 [hereinafter Supplemental Brief for Appellants]; Brief for
Appellants, supra note 16, at 23, 30; Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 12:41; Oral Argument
II, supra note 34, at 05:03.
190
Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.
191
Brief for Appellee, supra note 32, at 56; Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 48:20;
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 37:02.
192
Roe, 410 U.S. at 150–51.
193
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 07:48; Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 10:21.
194
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
195
Id.
196
Id.
188
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may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health
may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically or otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in
this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of
unwed motherhood may be involved.197
At oral argument, of course, Weddington stressed the impact unwanted
pregnancy has on the life of a woman.198
As is now well known, the Court announced in Part VIII of the opinion
that “[t]he privacy right involved . . . cannot be said to be absolute” and that
a court must consider the important state interests in regulating abortion.199
The Court found that a majority of state and federal abortion decisions over
the past two or three years reached this same conclusion.200 At the second
oral argument, Weddington had itemized the number of cases in lower courts
that held in favor of the woman.201 Yet the Appellee asserted in his brief202
and at the first oral argument that other constitutional rights are not
unlimited: “We have legal search and seizure. We have [criminalized] the
possession of illegal drugs, the practice of polygamy, and other matters.”203
The Court obviously agreed with both positions.
In Part IX, the Court addressed whether fetuses themselves have
constitutional protections, as distinct from whether states have interests in
protecting fetal life.204 Fetal personhood was a large focus of Appellee’s first
oral argument and the near-total content of the second oral argument.205
Unfortunately for these advocates, the Court concluded exactly the opposite
of the proffered arguments, which may have resulted largely from the
advocates’ failure to provide legal or medical evidence supporting the
assertion of fetal personhood.206
Analyzing the language of the Constitution, the Court concluded that a
fetus is not a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
constitutional protections do not attach until birth.207 The Court noted:
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 43–47, 119.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
Id. at 154–55.
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 01:00:56.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 32, at 8–9.
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 58:27.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 156–62.
See supra Parts II.B.2, II.C.2.
See supra text accompanying notes 88, 123–33.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 156–59.
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If this suggestion of personhood [before birth] is established, the
[A]ppellant’s case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life
would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. . . . On
the other hand, the [A]ppellee conceded on reargument that no
case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.208
Floyd made the same concession during the first oral argument: “I don’t
think the courts have come to the conclusion that the unborn has full juristic
rights. . . . I just don’t feel like they have, at the present time.”209
During both oral arguments, the Justices pressed Appellee’s advocates
to articulate and defend their assertions about when life begins.210 Though
both asserted that life began at conception, their positions fell apart upon
closer questioning.211 In the final majority opinion, the Court abandoned
efforts to determine when life begins, writing: “When those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of
man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.”212 The
Court reviewed the conflicting historical, legal, religious, and medical views
about when life begins, finally noting that “[i]n areas other than criminal
abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we
recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn
except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are
contingent upon live birth.”213 Weddington discussed this with the Justices
in her second oral argument, and the majority opinion contains—and
expands upon—the information she provided regarding tort injuries
available to babies who sustained injuries as fetuses as well as the inheritance
rights of the unborn.214
Part X of the majority opinion reiterated the woman’s right to choose
to terminate a pregnancy and the two “important and legitimate” state
interests of “preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman . . .
and . . . protecting the potentiality of human life.”215 The Court then
introduced the trimester framework for which Roe is remembered: (1) the
state may not infringe on the woman’s right to choose to terminate a
pregnancy during the first trimester; (2) the state’s interest in protecting the
woman’s health permits regulation of the procedure after the end of the first
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id. at 156–57; see also Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 28:15.
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 55:10.
See supra text accompanying notes 97, 123–33.
See supra text accompanying notes 97, 123–33.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 161–62; Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 25:18.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
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trimester; and (3) after viability, the state’s interest in the potential life
becomes “compelling” enough that the state “may go so far as to proscribe
abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life
or health of the mother.”216 Here, Weddington’s concession during the first
oral argument comes back to haunt her: “Obviously I have a much more
difficult time saying that the state has no interest in late pregnancy.”217
Though she quickly tried to characterize this interest as an “emotional
response to a late pregnancy”218 rather than as a constitutional interest, the
damage to her case was done.
“Measured against these [newly-announced] standards,” the Court
concluded, the Texas abortion law “sweeps too broadly” and is
unconstitutional.219 Based on this reasoning, the Court also declines to
address Roe’s argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.220
Part XII concludes the opinion.221 Here, the Court strikes down the
entirety of the Texas abortion statutes, and writes, “we assume the Texas
prosecutorial authorities will give full credence to this decision[.]”222
Procedurally, Dr. Hallford’s complaint is dismissed as an intervenor, but the
remainder of the District Court’s judgments are affirmed.223
Overall, the major surprise of the Roe majority opinion was the
announcement of the trimester framework, which neither party had briefed
nor argued. Over the course of both oral arguments, several Justices asked
questions about whether a state’s interest in protecting fetal life changed as
the pregnancy progressed. Justice White asked Weddington whether the
Texas statute “ma[d]e distinctions based upon what period of pregnancy the
abortion is performed[,]”224 and Chief Justice Burger asked Weddington
whether Texas could “constitutionally, in [her] view, declare by statute that
a fetus is a person for all constitutional purposes after the third month of
gestation?”225 There were no questions, however, that got as specific as the
ultimately-announced trimester framework.
All in all, comparing the oral arguments to the final majority opinion,
it is clear that strongly-argued points were influential, such as the impact of

216

Id. at 163–64.
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 23:34.
218
Id. at 23:42.
219
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
220
Id.
221
Part XI of the opinion is a summary of the foregoing that does not contain any new
substantive material.
222
Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.
223
Id. at 166–67.
224
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 22:28.
225
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 24:38.
217
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unwanted pregnancy on women’s lives,226 and the truism that constitutional
rights are not unlimited.227 It is also evident that weakly-argued points were
largely unpersuasive to the Justices, such as unsupported assertions that
fetuses have constitutional rights. The glaring exception, though, is that
despite Weddington’s inability (or unwillingness) to commit to a
constitutional theory that would support a woman’s right to abortion, the
majority of Justices found that right to exist, even though they were also
rather wishy-washy on where the right was found.228
Another important takeaway when comparing the oral arguments to the
majority opinion is that concessions matter. Each advocate made a
concession at oral argument that the Court raised against them in its opinion.
Weddington conceded at the first oral argument that she had “a much more
difficult time saying that the [S]tate has no interest in late pregnancy[,]”229
and conceded during the second oral argument that she “would have a very
difficult case” if the Court found that fetuses were people under the
Constitution.230 The advocates for Texas conceded that they had no sources
establishing fetal personhood, either legal231 or medical.232
Overall, it appears that the advocates’ performances at oral argument
did shape the majority opinion, in that the stronger advocacy found its way
into the opinion.
IV. ROE’S ORAL ARGUMENTS AND FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
Feminist legal theory233 was only in its infancy when Roe v. Wade was
argued and decided, and advocate Sarah Weddington admits she did not
incorporate even the nascent feminist legal theory into her case.234 From a
feminist standpoint, however, the case was both a product of its time and
also shaped feminism and feminist legal theory going forward. This section
analyzes both oral arguments in Roe v. Wade through various lenses of
feminist legal theory.235
226

See supra text accompanying notes 43–47, 119.
See supra text accompanying notes 91, 202–03.
228
See supra text accompanying note 195.
229
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 23:34.
230
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 24:13.
231
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 55:10; Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 28:15.
232
See supra text accompanying notes 124–28.
233
“[F]eminist theory assumes that the oppression of women is part of the way the
structure of the world is organized, and that one task of feminist theory is to explain how and
why this structure evolved.” Jane Flax, Women Do Theory, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS 81
(Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg eds., 3d ed. 1993).
234
Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018).
235
“[T]heoretical writing is often so full of jargon that it seems divorced from ordinary
experience.” Flax, supra note 233, at 81. This Article strives to avoid this problem.
227
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“Feminist legal theory” is, of course, a rich and diverse body of
scholarship, and it would be impossible to encapsulate all of it here. A few
primary schools of thought have emerged, however. This Article will briefly
summarize these schools, though it will go beyond these classifications in its
examination of the Roe oral arguments.
Equal treatment theory and liberal feminism posit that the law should
not treat women differently than similarly-situated men.236 Emphasizing the
similarities between men and women, equal treatment theory has had
primary implications in employment and economic settings.237 Equal
treatment theory also asserts that “the law should not base decisions about
individual women on generalizations (even statistically accurate ones) about
women as a group.”238 Accentuating the similarities between women and
men also means downplaying the differences, and liberal feminism has been
portrayed as “de-emphasi[zing] the mothering role.”239 Relatedly, equal
treatment theorists assert that pregnancy should be treated as any other
disability.240 Treating pregnancy as a disability, however, as the Family
Medical Leave Act does, means that only women will take such leave; this
means that women who desire to have children are technically protected by
the law, yet employers are still incentivized to hire men who will not be
requesting pregnancy-related leave.241
Cultural feminism emerged, in part, as a response to equal treatment
theory, acknowledging and embracing the biological and cultural differences
between women and men rather than focusing on similarities.242 Cultural
feminism is based on educational psychologist Carol Gilligan’s work and
book, In a Different Voice, which concluded “that women and men display
different emotional and cognitive traits and social skills. Women reason with
an ethic of care, emphasizing connections and relations with other people,
while men reason with an ethic of rights, stressing rules and autonomy
concerns.”243 Cultural feminist legal theory seeks to explore “how women’s
236
ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS & HUMAN NATURE 28 (1983) (liberal
feminism) (“The liberal conception of the good society . . . is one that . . . protect[s] the
dignity of each individual and promote[s] individual autonomy and self-fulfillment.”); NANCY
LEVIT & ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 12 (2006) (equal
treatment theory).
237
LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 8.
238
Id. at 16.
239
MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 22 (3d ed. 2013).
240
LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 21.
241
Id. at 21–22.
242
LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 18.
243
Id. at 9, 19–20. This takeaway—that women reason with an ethic of care and men
reason with an ethic of rights—is a bit of an oversimplification of Gilligan’s thesis. Gilligan’s
book grew out of her observations that oftentimes women talked about their lives in language
that did not fit the psychological models of the time. Gilligan suggested this meant not that
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‘different voice’—with its concern for human relationships and for the
positive values of caring, nurturing, empathy, and connection—could find
greater expression in law.”244
By considering women’s “different voice,” cultural feminism also
“br[ought] into focus the thoroughgoing but previously unacknowledged
gender-structuring of human society and human nature.”245 This school of
thought asserts that purely formal equality of opportunity does not lead
directly to equality of results: that “identical treatment of each group might
never produce meaningful equality.”246 For example, cultural feminists
argue that pregnancy-specific disability policies are sensible and appropriate,
because the condition burdens only women.247 Without gender-specific
protections, women who “could not perform as men [in the workplace] [are]
not entitled to equal treatment and need not be hired.”248
Equal treatment theory, liberal feminism, and cultural feminism have
been criticized for setting out the male experience as the norm, addressing
the female experience only insofar as it is similar to or different from the
male.249 Cultural feminism, with its emphasis on “empathy, nurturing, [and]
caretaking” has also been criticized for “reinforc[ing] women’s stereotypical
association with domesticity.”250
Dominance theory, developed by Catharine MacKinnon in 1979,
focuses on the difference in power between men and women.251 The theory
identifies economic, political, and familial inequalities that arise from
patterns of male domination.252 Dominance theory has been influential in

women were flawed, but that the models were. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 1–4 (1982). Gilligan did not attempt
to analyze the origins of the differences in language used by men and women, but noted that
“[c]learly, these differences arise in a social context where factors of social status and power
combine with reproductive biology to shape the experience of males and females and the
relation between the sexes.” Id. at 2.
244
CHAMALLAS, supra note 239, at 22.
245
JAGGAR, supra note 236, at 98.
246
CHAMALLAS, supra note 239, at 21.
247
Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1701
(1990).
248
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal
Education or “The Fem-Crits Go to Law School”, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 72 (1988).
249
See SHARON L. ROACH ANLEU, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 428 (2d ed. 2010) (“As male
is the implicit reference for human, maleness will be the measure of equality in sex
discrimination law.”); see also LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 9.
250
LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 20.
251
See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 32 (1988).
252
See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v.
Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000).
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reshaping legal approaches to rape, sexual harassment, and pornography,253
but it is criticized for framing all women as victims and universalizing the
female experience (especially the white, middle-class female experience.)254
Postmodern feminist legal theory and critical race feminism are two
newer schools of intersectional feminist legal theory, which stress the
differences between women’s experiences, especially when looking across
racial and socioeconomic lines.255 These theories reject the idea that women
have universal experiences.
Between and among these various schools of feminist legal theory
emerge two theoretical axes. First, are women best considered as being like
men or different from them? Second, are women better theorized as a group
or as individuals? This section asks where along these axes the Roe v. Wade
oral arguments were framed, and whether that framing was ultimately
harmful or beneficial.256
A. Are Women Like Men, or Are They Different?
A recurring theme in contemporary feminist thought focuses on
“difference.” On one side, feminists argue that to overcome
oppression and inequality women must be treated equally or in the
same way as men. In contrast, others maintain that women have
distinctive and special qualities which should be recognized and

253
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985).
254
E.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 585 (1990). Harris argues that MacKinnon’s work
though powerful and brilliant in many ways, relies on . . . gender
essentialism—the notion that a unitary, “essential” women’s experience
can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual
orientation, and other realities of experience. The result of this tendency
toward gender essentialism . . . is not only that some voices are silenced
in order to privilege others . . . but that the voices that are silenced turn
out to be the same voices silenced by the mainstream legal voice of “We
the People”—among them, the voices of black women.
Id.
255
See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); see also
CHAMALLAS, supra note 239, at 23–26. Other schools of feminist thought also exist, but are
omitted here as not being particularly useful in analyzing the Roe v. Wade oral arguments—
e.g., lesbian legal theory, pragmatic legal feminism, and ecofeminism. See LEVIT &
VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 29–31, 34–44 for more on those theories.
256
Future works should also analyze the Roe v. Wade oral arguments and the
public/private dichotomy, such as Weddington’s assertion that, “a woman, because of her
pregnancy, is often not a productive member of society. She cannot work, she cannot hold a
job, she’s not eligible for welfare, she cannot get unemployment compensation. And
furthermore, in fact, the pregnancy may produce a child who will become a ward of the state.”
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 01:00:10.
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given greater credence.257
1. Individual Right or Gender Discrimination?
Roe v. Wade was briefed and argued as a due process case, not as an
equal protection case, meaning that the Plaintiffs in Roe framed their case
not as a gender discrimination case, but as an individual rights case.258 But
why should this be so, when abortion is perhaps the most gendered legal
issue the Court has decided?
The most straightforward answer is that at the time Roe was being
decided, gender discrimination was not unconstitutional. Craig v. Boren, the
case in which the Supreme Court announced that discrimination on the basis
of gender would be subject to heightened scrutiny, was argued and decided
in 1976,259 three years after the Roe decision and six years after the Roe
Plaintiffs originally filed suit.
So, while gender cases would later be analyzed under an equal
protection framework, that argument was not available to Roe. Weddington
admitted at the first oral argument that the suit had originally been brought
“alleging both [a violation of] the Due Process [C]lause, [the] Equal
Protection [C]lause, the Ninth Amendment, and a variety of others[,]”260 but
the equal protection argument had fallen away by the time the case was
briefed for the Supreme Court—neither the briefs nor the oral arguments
included an equal protection or explicit gender discrimination argument.
This was probably a good strategic decision, as the Court of this era was not
prepared to consider pregnancy to be a gendered issue.261
Instead, the Plaintiffs’ case was argued under an individual rights
analysis, relying on either the Ninth Amendment262 or the Fourteenth
Amendment263 to support a woman’s right to terminate an unwanted
257

ANLEU, supra note 249, at 424.
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985) (“Overall, the Court’s Roe position is
weakened, I believe, by the opinion’s concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea,
to the exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective.”).
259
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
260
Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 19:16.
261
See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that the exclusion of
pregnancy from disability insurance does not violate the Equal Protection Clause). “The lack
of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this insurance program
becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients into
two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively
female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the
program thus accrue to members of both sexes.” Id. at 496 n.20.
262
U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
263
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”).
258
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pregnancy. During her first oral argument, Weddington made this assertion:
I think the Fourteenth Amendment is equally an appropriate place
[to find the right to abortion], under the rights of persons to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. I think that in as far as
“liberty” is meaningful, that liberty to these women would mean
liberty from being forced to continue the unwanted pregnancy.264
Weddington failed to expand effectively on this point, however. The
Court had written in 1923 that the liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause includes the freedom “to marry, establish a home and bring
up children[,]”265 and Weddington was familiar with the case law that came
after. At the first oral argument, however, it appeared she could only suggest
constitutional arguments, rather than actually make them.266
During the second oral argument, Weddington asserted the individual
rights argument in more detail:
The main [constitutional grounds] that we are relying on before
this Court are the Fifth, Ninth, and the Fourteenth Amendments.
There’s a great body of precedent. . . . The Court has[,] in the past,
for example, held that it is the right of parents and of the individual
to determine whether or not they will send their child to private
school, whether or not their children will be taught foreign
languages, whether or not they will have offspring[—]the Skinner
case[—]whether the right to determine for themselves whom they
will marry[—]the Loving case[—]and even in Boddie versus
Connecticut the choice saying that marriage itself is so important
that the state cannot interfere with termination of a marriage just
because the woman is unable to pay the cost. Griswold, of course,
is the primary case[,] holding that the state could not interfere in
the question of whether or not a married couple would use birth
control and, since then, . . . this Court, of course, has held that the
individual has the right to determine[,] whether they are married
or single, whether they would use birth control. So there is a great
body of cases decided in the past by this Court in the areas of
marriage, sex, contraception, procreation, childbearing, and
education of children which says that there are certain things that
are so much part of the individual concern that they should be left
to the determination of the individual.267
Again here, Weddington argues that abortion is an extension of the
rights already recognized by the Court that allow individuals to make
decisions about their families. There is one more logical step Weddington
264
265
266
267

Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 18:49.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
See supra text accompanying notes 49–53.
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 06:41.
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could have taken here, but she stops just short: she could have made explicit
the argument that, if birth control is constitutionally protected so people do
not become parents if they do not want to, then abortion should be
constitutionally protected for the same reason.268
As briefed and argued, the Plaintiffs’ emphasis on individual rights,
rather than women’s rights, also fits with the equal treatment theory that was
gaining ground during this era: that women are like men and should be
treated the same.269 Both male and female humans can be parents—from
that perspective, there is nothing particularly gendered about the right to
procreate or the right to have access to birth control, and framing abortion as
one more option in an individual’s decision to form a family and/or become
a parent removes the gendered impact of the abortion procedure.
There is, of course, an obvious hole in this approach, which is that
pregnancy is experienced exclusively by women, and that unwanted
pregnancies in particular burden women in a far different way than men. In
that sense, Jane Roe was hamstrung by the individual rights and equal
treatment approaches—the ability to have access to contraception, for
example, applied to both men and women, meaning every individual could
potentially make use of the right articulated in Griswold and Eisenstadt. A
right to abortion, on the other hand, would not apply to all individuals, only
women.
Moreover, in the first oral argument, when Weddington spoke about
privacy and individual rights, she discussed the impact of the Texas abortion
law on women exclusively. During the portion of the argument devoted to
the vagueness of the statute, she argued that the statute impacted doctors—
universally referred to as “he’s” during the case—but she never discussed
how the abortion statute affected the individual rights of potential fathers,
and the Justices did not ask.270 Thus, there was a fundamental disconnect
between the gender-neutral argument required by the Due Process Clause
and the gendered impact Weddington was arguing before the Court.
In both oral arguments, Weddington emphasized the policy rationales
that supported her position that the abortion statute was bad for women, but
268

The majority opinion also fails to explain the connection between family planning via
contraceptives and via abortion. See Kobylka, supra note 105, at 1091.
269
See CHAMALLAS, supra note 239, at 44. As Weddington argued Roe, equal treatment
theory was gaining traction in legal spheres. See Ginsburg, supra note 258, at 377–78 (finding
the strategy effective). But see LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 17 (finding mixed
results).
270
In the final moments of his time at the first oral arguments, Wade advocate, Jay Floyd,
suggested that “in some instances, a consideration should be given for the father, if he would
be objective to abortion.” Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 01:02:13. The Court did not
take up this possibility, either at oral argument or in the opinion. For more on Roe and men,
see infra Part IV.A.3.
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her emphasis on the suffering of women would have better supported a
gender discrimination analysis, rather than a due process argument. The
reverse is also true: in making a due process argument, Weddington would
have done better to emphasize the impact of the Texas abortion law upon
potential parents, rather than just women.
2. Ethic of Rights, Ethic of Care
Cultural feminism as a legal theory had not yet been developed when
Roe was being litigated, but the oral arguments and the opinion reflect, and
indeed may have influenced, its underlying framework. Cultural feminism
posits that women frame concepts of justice according to an ethic of care,
“stressing connections and relations with other people[,]” while men
consider justice according to an ethic of rights, “stressing rules and
autonomy.”271 As a result of these differences, some scholars conclude that
“[w]omen’s morality arises from the experience of connection which they
conceive of as a problem of inclusion rather than one of balancing competing
claims, whereas men value individual achievement, separation, and
competition.”272 This theory has been criticized for reinforcing stereotypical
female domesticity and characterizing women as needing protection,273 and
it ignores the role of socialization within a patriarchal system on the
“different” moral and emotional development of boys and girls.274
In her initial oral argument—fairly criticized for being more of a
lobbyist pitch than a constitutional analysis275—Weddington utilized
frequent feminist techniques of storytelling276 and contextual reasoning277 in
arguing that the Texas abortion statutes were bad for women, and that the
idea poor women were more likely to carry unwanted pregnancies to term
was unfair.278 This ethic of care, emphasizing the personal in arriving at a
concept of justice, did not sit well with the (male) Justices. During her
second oral argument, Weddington changed her angle, shifting away from
story- and policy-based arguments to rights-based arguments more grounded
in the Constitution:

271

Menkel-Meadow, supra note 248, at 78–79; see also GILLIGAN, supra note 243, at 174
(“While an ethic of justice proceeds from the premise of equality—that everyone should be
treated the same—an ethic of care rests on the premise of nonviolence—that no one should
be hurt.”).
272
ANLEU, supra note 249, at 425.
273
LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 18.
274
I am grateful to Kyle Velte for this insight.
275
EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 6, at 179.
276
LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 50.
277
Id. at 44–49.
278
See supra text accompanying notes 43–46.
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Justice Blackmun: Do I get from this, then, that your case depends
primarily on the proposition that the fetus has no constitutional
rights?
Weddington: It depends on saying that the woman has a
fundamental constitutional right and that the [S]tate has not
proved any compelling interest for regulation in the area.279
We are here to advocate that the decision as to whether or not a
particular woman will continue to carry or will terminate a
pregnancy is a decision that should be made by that individual.
That, in fact, she has a constitutional right to make that decision
for herself and that the [S]tate has shown no [compelling] interest
in interfering with that decision.280
I am urging that, in this particular context, this statute is
unconstitutional that in the Baird v. Eisenstadt case, this Court
said that if the right of privacy is to mean anything, it is the right
of the individual, whether married or single, to make
determinations for themselves.281
Viewing the oral arguments through the lens of cultural feminism, then,
suggests that Weddington was more successful arguing a rights-based
approach to the men on the bench. The final opinion is defined by its rightsbased analysis: the majority opinion carefully delineates the right of a
woman to terminate a pregnancy, the fetus’s lack of constitutional rights, and
the moments at which the state’s interest in protecting maternal health and
protecting fetal life matures. Viewed from the vantage point of the majority
opinion, Weddington’s masculine, ethic of rights-based approach during the
second oral argument was more effective than her ethic of care-based
argument the first time.
Now-Justice Ginsburg has hypothesized that the Roe v. Wade opinion
created such a firestorm because it “ventured too far in the change it
ordered[,]”282 and that the trimester framework announced by the Court went
so far past Appellants’ comparatively modest request to strike down the
“extreme” Texas statute.283 Through a cultural feminism lens, however, the
(male) justices may have felt the trimester framework was necessary to
carefully delineate which party had which rights and when. Utilizing an
ethic of rights, the Justices in the majority may have felt it especially
important to articulate when the state’s two interests (protecting the woman’s
279

Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 23:19.
Id. at 01:01:48.
281
Id. at 01:03:06.
282
Ginsburg, supra note 258, at 376.
283
Id. at 385; see also Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 56:02. Justice White: “I gather
your argument is that the state may not protect the life of the fetus or prevent an abortion even,
at any time during pregnancy. Right up until the moment of birth.” Weddington: “At this
time, my point is that this particular statute is unconstitutional.” Id.
280
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health and protecting fetal life) mature.284
Gilligan did not conclude that men and women inherently reason
differently; she explicitly declined to analyze whether women’s concern for
relationships over rights was biological or the result of socialization.285 I am
skeptical that women inherently reason with an ethic of care, but I theorize
that our society reasons about women with an ethic of care.286 Women are
expected to focus on relationships and are indeed frequently defined by their
relationships—particularly when those women are mothers.287
Using this perspective, then, the backlash against Roe is explainable not
because the opinion impresses an ethic of rights onto women who reason
with an ethic of care. Instead, the backlash can be traced to the opinion’s
granting individual rights to pregnant women independent of their
relationships, particularly their relationship to the fetus.288 The majority
opinion finds that women have a due process right to choose to terminate a
pregnancy, but finds that the fetus has no constitutional rights. The objection
to this framework may be based, at least in part, in the rejection of the notion
of a woman having her own rights, separate and apart from her relationships
to other people, particularly her potential child.
During oral argument, the advocates reinforce their emphasis on the
woman’s individual rights or on the woman’s relationship to the fetus.
Weddington consistently refers to pregnant women, either in the plural or the
singular, and occasionally refers to Jane Roe as “an unmarried pregnant

284
Of course, the Justices are justices, and they are supposed to be rights-oriented. Then
again, the Constitution and the entire U.S. legal system was designed by men, and the ethic
of care versus the ethic of rights thesis of cultural feminism suggests that law in the United
States is naturally rights-based in its reasoning. This begs the question of what a legal and
constitutional system would look like if it were based on an ethic of care, emphasizing
relationships over individual rights.
285
GILLIGAN, supra note 243, at 2.
286
See ANLEU, supra note 249, at 426. Anleu suggests that women’s biological potential
for pregnancy means they have the “experience of connection [which] contrasts with the
essentially masculine ideals of separation and individuation which underpin modern liberal
legal theory. Women’s lives are relational not autonomous; their experience of being human
is different from that of men.” Id. (footnote omitted). While I am unwilling to accept that
possession of a uterus causes a woman to inherently reason differently, I readily believe that
possession of a uterus causes women to be socialized and taught differently than men. I also
recognize that not every woman has a uterus.
287
See GILLIGAN, supra note 243, at 23. The author concludes that when human
development is considered only from the vantage point of “man’s life cycle[, which includes]
the celebration of separation, autonomy, individuation, and natural rights,” the role of a
woman is “to protect” “the continuing importance of attachment[.]” Id.
288
In the final moments of his time at the first oral arguments, Floyd suggested that “in
some instances, a consideration should be given for the father, if he would be objective to
abortion.” Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 01:02:13. The Court did not take up this
possibility, either at oral argument or in the opinion.
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girl.”289 Floyd and Flowers, arguing for Wade and the State of Texas, both
consistently refer to pregnant women as “mothers,”290 even though a
pregnant woman is not typically considered a mother until the child is born—
baby shower cards congratulate the “mother-to-be” rather than the
“mother.”291 These word choices at oral argument were significant. By
calling pregnant women “mothers,” Floyd and Flowers are emphasizing the
woman’s relationship to the utterly dependent fetus, in an effort to make an
abortion seem not only like the ending of a life, but as a violence against the
very role women are expected to play in society—that of caretakers. Justice
White, who dissented in Roe, also referred to pregnant women as “mothers”
several times during the oral arguments.292 Weddington, by contrast, refers
to the women themselves, referencing pregnancy as a condition affecting the
individual. Weddington’s deliberate use of the word “girl” to describe Jane
Roe is, of course, problematic: at twenty-one years of age, Roe was an adult,
but referring to her as a “girl” made her sound childlike, victimized, and
unable to be held responsible for her pregnancy.293
Thus, much of the Roe oral arguments can be boiled down to a
discussion of whether the pregnant woman has rights of her own. The
majority opinion, written by men as part of a legal system designed by men,
answers that question in the affirmative. Granting such a right to a woman
as an individual, however, defies the powerful social construct of women not
as individuals, but as nodes in networks of people.
3. Roe and Men
Of the various schools of feminist legal theory, dominance theory is
defined by its emphasis on the difference in power between men and
women.294 Indeed, “there are real advantages to men in retaining control
over women. Feminist theorists want to explain why that’s so.”295
Texas’s abortion law can certainly be viewed as men exercising power
over women: the male-dominated legislature passed a statute that severely
restricted women’s access to abortion, effectively forcing women to remain

289

Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 01:17; Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 01:06.
The use of the identical phrase “unmarried pregnant girl” during both opening statements
cannot be accidental.
290
E.g., Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 26:20.
291
No disparagement is intended toward those women whose pregnancies have ended in
miscarriage or stillbirth, and who consider themselves mothers to those children.
292
E.g., Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 15:53, 31:55, 37:22. For Justice White’s
dissent, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221 (1973).
293
For more on the concept of victimhood in abortion law, see infra Part IV.B.1.
294
See supra text accompanying notes 251–54.
295
Flax, supra note 233, at 82.
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pregnant and bear unwanted children.296 Weddington characterized the issue
in the case as “the question of whether or not [women] will be forced by the
[S]tate to continue an unwanted pregnancy[,]”297 and in later discussing
unwanted pregnancy as an “injury,” she said, “the women who continue to
be forced to go through pregnancy have certainly gone through something
that is irreparable, that can never be changed for them.”298
Considered more deeply, however, there are two separate instances of
men exerting power over women in the context of Roe and the Texas
abortion statute: that of the overwhelmingly male legislature exerting power
over doctors,299 and the universally male doctors exerting power over
pregnant women.
The abortion statute at issue in Roe was a criminal statute directed not
at women seeking abortions, but at the doctors willing or able to perform
them.300 In that way, the legislature exerted control over women indirectly,
by controlling (and limiting) the behavior of doctors.301 During both sets of
oral arguments, the Justices indicated interest in what the legislature’s
purpose had been in passing the abortion statute.302 During the second oral
argument, Justice Stewart stated, “The materials indicate that, generally
speaking, [abortion statutes are] enacted to protect the health and lives of
pregnant women because of the danger of operative procedures generally in
296

See also Flax, supra note 233, at 83 (“Why didn’t the oppression of women disappear
[in the supposedly classless Soviet Union]? For one thing, the structure of the family was not
altered—no efforts were made to change the reproductive sphere.”).
297
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 06:18.
298
Id. at 10:03.
299
After the completion of the Roe v. Wade oral arguments, Weddington ran for the Texas
House of Representatives so she could be sure to influence abortion access for women
irrespective of the case’s outcome. Telephone interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor
of History, University of Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018).
300
There is an interesting standing dilemma regarding Jane Roe, separate from the rather
well-known problem of mootness. Rather, the more nuanced standing problem is that Roe
was filing suit to challenge a criminal statute she was not subject to. The statute criminalized
the doctor’s behavior, not the woman’s. Texas case law made it very clear that a pregnant
woman was the victim of an abortion, not the perpetrator, even when she sought, procured, or
even performed an abortion for herself. Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 07:48. The idea
that women are the victims of criminal abortion statutes is ripe for additional feminist analysis.
301
So, too, did the state exert power over women when Dallas County District Attorney,
Henry Wade, and Assistant District Attorney, John B. Tolle, announced that their office would
continue to prosecute doctors even though the statute had been declared unconstitutional. See
Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at Appendix A; see also Oral Argument II, supra note
34, at 02:46 (Weddington: “The problem that we face in Texas is that even though we were
granted a declaratory judgment ruling the law unconstitutional and even though we’ve been
before this Court once in the past, in Texas, women still are not able to receive abortions from
licensed doctors because doctors still fear that they will be prosecuted under the statute.”).
This quote from Weddington also suggests that the Supreme Court’s delay in deciding the
case is yet another instance of men exerting power over women.
302
See supra text accompanying notes 94–96.
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that era of our history [the late 19th century].”303 Weddington had pointed
out that if the State’s purpose was the protection of fetal life, it makes no
sense that a woman who obtains an abortion is not guilty of a crime304 and
that “the penalty for abortion is determined by whether you have the
woman’s consent”305—the Texas statute provided that the penalty for
providing an abortion was doubled “if it be done without her consent.”306
It is noteworthy that so much of the Roe oral arguments are spent
discussing the doctors who perform abortions—doctors who are universally
referred to with male pronouns—and what constraints are placed on the
doctors’ practice of medicine. By their questions, the Justices demonstrate
that they are keenly interested in how the case affects the men who practice
medicine in Texas and across the United States. During the second oral
argument, the first question posed was Chief Justice Burger’s request that
Weddington clarify whether she was discussing “the prosecutions of
doctors” under the statute307—no Justice asked a question about women until
almost sixteen minutes into the argument.308 Justice Blackmun pointedly
asked during the second rebuttal, “To make sure I get your argument in
focus, I take it from your recent remarks that you are urging upon us abortion
on demand of the woman alone, not in conjunction with her physician.”309
In the second oral argument, Weddington capitalized on the Justices’
interest in doctors’ freedom to practice when she pointed out:
That, in Vuitch, this Court had before it the D.C. statute which
allowed abortion for the purpose of saving the life or the health,
and this Court adopted the interpretation that health meant both
mental and physical health. And, it seemed to me, the Court’s
language in that case talked a great deal about the fact that the
doctor’s judgment goes to saving the health of the woman, that
that’s the kind of judgment that he is used to making. In Texas,
that’s not the judgment he is forced to make. The judgment in
Texas is, is this necessary for the purpose of preserving the life of
the woman?, and the language of that statute has never been
interpreted. That’s not the kind of judgment that a doctor is
accustomed or perhaps even able to make.310

303

Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 54:09.
Id. at 10:34.
305
Id. at 13:22.
306
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1191 (repealed 1973).
307
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 02:40.
308
Id. at 15:53 (Justice White: “You’re going to be balancing the rights of the mother
against the rights of the fetus[?]”).
309
Id. at 01:02:51.
310
Id. at 18:45.
304
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And again:
Here, it’s the question of whether or not the [S]tate, by the statute,
will force the woman to continue [a pregnancy]. The woman
should be given that freedom, just as the doctor has the freedom
to decide what procedures he will carry out and what he will refuse
to his patient.311
Justice Blackmun’s fixation on the Hippocratic Oath is another
example of the Court’s interest in men’s rights (rather than women’s).
During the second oral argument, Justice Blackmun demanded to know why
Weddington had not discussed the Hippocratic Oath in either of her briefs.312
She replied: “The fact that the medical profession, at one time, had adopted
the Hippocratic Oath does not weigh upon the fundamental constitutional
rights involved. It is a guide for physicians[.]”313 And she was right—
Plaintiff Jane Doe was arguing that the Texas abortion statute infringed on
her individual right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, and that the [S]tate
had not established a compelling interest that would justify the curtailment
of that right; a statement of medical ethics bears no relation to the
determination of constitutional rights. Justice Blackmun could not let the
point go, however; the final opinion dwelled on the Hippocratic Oath for
several paragraphs, analyzing it as one type of restriction on the physician’s
behavior. Since the Justices and advocates universally refer to doctors with
male pronouns, the obvious conclusion is that the Court simply cannot
consider restrictions on women’s behavior independently from restrictions
on men’s behavior.
Also noteworthy is the fact that the majority opinion cannot quite grant
women the individual, autonomous right to abortion—the right is tied to their
doctors:314
[F]or the period of pregnancy prior to this “compelling” point, the
attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to
determine without regulation by the State, that, in his medical
judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated. If that
decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an
abortion free of interference by the State.315
Read in the most cynical way, this language grants women mere
“consultation” rights regarding their abortions; the right to determine that the
abortion is warranted is the doctor’s. As discussed above, this may evidence
311

Id. at 1:02:38.
Id. at 20:37.
313
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 21:07.
314
Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 43, 53
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995).
315
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (emphasis added).
312
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the social tendency to define women in relation to other people,316 but it also
evidences the Court’s inability to focus exclusively on the rights of women,
but instead to define the rights of men.
B. Are Women Individuals or a Collective?
Despite equal treatment theory’s admonition that “the law should not
base decisions about individual women on generalizations (even statistically
accurate ones) about women as a group[,]”317 Weddington frequently cites
statistics about women and abortion:
[T]here have been something like 1,600 Texas women who have
gone to New York City alone for abortions in the first nine months
of 1971.318
[T]he overall maternal death rate from legal abortion in New York
dropped to 3.7 per 100,000 abortions in the last half of 1971, and
that, in fact, is less than half of the death rate associated with live
delivery for women.319
Weddington’s use of both statistics and storytelling320 illustrate a tension in
the way the Roe advocates, Justices, and opinion consider women:
sometimes women are grouped together, their experiences made universal,
while at other times women’s individual situations are paramount.
1. Victimhood
Dominance theory has been criticized not only for universalizing the
white, middle-class female experience, but for framing women collectively
as victims.321 Certainly, Weddington painted Texas women as victims in
both oral arguments.322
Victimhood disempowers women, and pregnant women in particular.
The Roe Court obviously found that women have a fundamental right to
choose to terminate a pregnancy, but the idea of pregnant women as victims,
and thus in need of protection, has not left the abortion debate. It is this
mentality that allows legislatures to pass laws requiring twenty-four-hour
waiting periods before obtaining an abortion323—as if women did not
understand the gravity of their decision when they first walked in to the
clinic, but instead need guidance, enlightenment, and protection so as to
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avoid making a decision they will later regret.324
2. Decision-making
The law has frequently struggled with the idea that women are able to
make meaningful decisions. “This attitude not only fueled the exclusion of
women from the jury and the franchise, but also contributed, in the view of
some scholars, to the efforts of state officials to regulate reproductive
experience.”325 On the other hand, “[s]ome cultural feminists argue that it is
precisely because women have such a deep capacity for connection and
caring that society should trust their independent and morally responsible
decision-making regarding abortion.”326
At oral argument, Weddington certainly emphasized the importance of
pregnant women being able to decide for themselves whether to continue or
terminate a pregnancy.327 The Court superficially agreed, finding the right
to privacy “broad enough to encompass [this] decision[,]”328 yet requiring
this decision to be made together with a doctor.329 The inability to consider
a woman an autonomous agent subordinates her.330
V. CONCLUSION
The oral arguments for Roe v. Wade were a metaphor for the case itself
and for the nationwide abortion debate it continues to represent— full of
contradictions.
Sarah Weddington was the only woman with a microphone, arguing
against male advocates to an all-male bench. She argued on behalf of
women, but could not benefit from the language of gender discrimination in
asserting her case. She was by far the best-prepared advocate at the podium,
but she made little headway with the bench until she argued like a man,
asserting rights over policy. Yet within her constitutional arguments, she
shied away from taking a firm position, fearing alienation of any Justice.
Like the contradictions within the oral arguments, the opinion is full of
steps forward and steps back. The Court ultimately found that the ill-defined
right to privacy nonetheless included the right to abortion, but denied women
the autonomy to make that private choice, finding instead that the choice
324

See generally Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of
Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (2007).
325
Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women’s Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761, 784–85 (1990).
326
LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 141.
327
See supra text accompanying note 114.
328
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
329
See supra text accompanying notes 314–15.
330
Tracy E. Higgins, “By Reason of Their Sex”: Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and
Justice, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1536, 1538 (1995).

CHRISTOPHER (DO NOT DELETE)

352

12/17/2018 4:04 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:307

must be made in connection with male doctors.
What lessons can advocates take away from the lessons of the Roe oral
arguments? Are there specific lessons for abortion cases, for women’s
rights, or for civil rights?
Perhaps the biggest take-away is that change comes incrementally.
Weddington made a big ask, seeking a determination by the Court that the
constitution protected a right to abortion, but she did so by offering a menu
of possible rationales and implying that they were small extensions of
existing privacy doctrine. She did not ask that Roe be the first gender
discrimination case, and she was right to be conservative there—although
the Justices found a constitutionally-protected right to abortion, they were
unwilling to find that right belonging to the woman alone. Given that the
Justices felt the need to connect this extension of privacy law to women in
conjunction with their doctors, it is unlikely the Justices would have found
this to be the seminal case on gender discrimination.
The second, more cynical lesson is that women’s rights cannot be
defined without relating them to the rights of men, though the reverse is not
true. Although the Court did not consider the possible rights of fathers, the
idea of women as autonomous decision makers, defined as individuals rather
than by their relationships with others, was so unrealistic as to be impossible.
At oral argument, pregnant women were portrayed as victims, even by
Weddington herself, requiring the paternal guidance and protection of
doctors, legislators, and even Justices.
More broadly, Roe is an example of the Court defining rights in a zerosum way. By carefully articulating the rights of a woman (and her doctor),
the lack of rights of the fetus, and the interests of the state, and where those
rights appear and disappear along the timeline of a pregnancy, the Court
cannot conceive of a constitutional scheme that benefits all actors. Perhaps
the next incarnation of a gendered constitutional problem, with female
advocates and female Justices no longer anomalies in the courtroom, will
result in a new way of conceptualizing the autonomy of all individuals—
even female ones.

